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Sanctuary Networks and Integrative 
Enforcement  
Ming Hsu Chen* 
Abstract 
My intended focus is on the widespread response—in cities, 
churches, campuses, and corporations that together comprise 
“sanctuary networks”1—to the Trump Administration’s Executive 
Order 13768 Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United 
States2 as an instance of the changing relationship between federal, 
local, and private organizations in the regulation of immigration. 
After briefly covering the legal background of the Trump Interior 
E.O., the focus of the Article shifts to the institutional dynamics 
arising in communities. These institutional dynamics exemplify the 
beginnings of a reimagined immigration enforcement policy with a 
more integrative flavor.  
                                                                                                     
 * Associate Professor, University of Colorado Law and Political Science 
and Faculty-Director, Immigration Law and Policy Program. Special thanks to 
David Baluarte and the W&L Editors, plus Symposium panelists Jason Cade, 
Cesar Garcia Hernandez, and Stephen Lee. Huyen Pham, Shannon Gleeson, Rose 
Villazor, Deep Gulasekaram, and U.C. Davis’ Advanced Immigration Seminar 
provided valuable insights, and the U.C. Berkeley Center for the Study of Law 
and Society provided a welcoming environment while I worked on this Article as 
a visiting scholar. Further discussion of integrative enforcement can be found in 
Constructing Citizenship for Noncitizens, Stanford University Press (forthcoming 
2020).  
 1. This phrase comes from Rose C. Villazor & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, 
Sanctuary Networks, 102 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 32), 
https://www.immigrationresearch-info.org/system/files/SSRN-id3038943.pdf. 
 2. See Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017) [hereinafter 
Trump Interior E.O.] (defining “sanctuary jurisdictions” as those that “willfully 
refuse to comply with 8 U.S.C. 1373”). The term “sanctuary” or “sanctuary city” 
is not defined by statute. 
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I. Introduction 
Despite the overwhelmingly exclusionary overtones in federal 
immigration policy, integrative enforcement is emerging as a 
response to President Trump’s Executive Order 13768 Enhancing 
Public Safety in the Interior of the United States (Trump Interior 
E.O.).3 Taking seriously that laws operate in society and not 
merely on-the-books, this Article enlarges the scope of 
consideration to the interaction of the Interior E.O. with state, 
local, and private resistance. It identifies an inclusionary 
undercurrent in this web of resistance. This Article examines the 
                                                                                                     
 3. Id. 
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integrative nature of these networked policies and their 
implications for national immigration policy. 
Understanding the inclusionary thrust of emerging state, 
local, and private policies towards immigrants requires 
understanding the shifting terrain of immigration enforcement. 
Immigration enforcement has been expanding and intensifying for 
a while. The Trump Interior E.O. continues this trend by seeking 
to further expand the targets of interior enforcement and to further 
intensify punishment of sanctuary jurisdictions for noncooperation 
with federal enforcement. As enforcement has expanded, 
community resistance has also expanded to more sites and broader 
purposes. Particularly prominent are courtroom challenges to the 
Interior E.O. sanctuary provisions on the basis of immigration 
federalism.4 States and localities have been winning these lawsuits 
on the basis of constitutional issues such as the spending clause, 
state sovereignty, and due process. These states and localities 
claim to function as partners in immigration policymaking, 
whether in a cooperative or uncooperative posture.5 Easier to miss 
is the contestation over immigration policy occurring outside the 
courts. Campuses, churches, and corporations are stepping into 
the void, seeking to resist the federal government and to be 
welcoming communities for immigrants rather than sites of 
exclusion and intimidation. In a manner not compelled by law, 
they voluntarily adopt value statements and spend (or raise) 
money for optional resources to improve the lives of immigrants in 
their communities.  
After briefly tracing the historical and legal background of the 
Interior E.O.’s expanded priorities and sanctuary provisions, this 
Article examines the emergence of “sanctuary networks” as an 
                                                                                                     
 4. See generally PRATHEEPAN GULASEKARAM & S. KARTHICK RAMAKRISHNAN, 
THE NEW IMMIGRATION FEDERALISM (2015); see, e.g., Stella Burch Elias, The New 
Immigration Federalism, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 703, 704–22 (2013) (“‘[A]lienage laws,’ 
which are laws that determine the rights, privileges, and obligations of 
noncitizens present in the United States, can . . . be enacted by either the federal 
government or the states.”). 
 5. Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 
118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1281–84 (2009) (discussing states’ role in enforcing federal 
immigration law by stating that “some states have gone further than federal law 
requires . . . while others have taken the opposite stance and passed 
noncooperation laws that reject federal efforts”). 
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instance of what I will call “integrative enforcement” in 
immigration policymaking.  
II. Background on Interior E.O. and Sanctuary Networks 
President Trump issued three immigration executive orders 
within his first month in office that together reveal a federal policy 
of vigorous enforcement against an expanding group of 
immigrants. The Trump Interior E.O. and its accompanying 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) regulations consist of a 
package of policies concerning enforcement against immigrants 
residing inside the borders, some of whom lack lawful immigration 
status and some of whom have engaged in criminal activity. 
Section 4 directs federal agencies to employ “all lawful means” to 
execute U.S. immigration laws against “all removable aliens.” 6 As 
part of this effort, Sections 8 and 9 seek to expand the local ability 
to assist in enforcing immigration laws and to sanction “sanctuary 
jurisdictions” that “prohibit or . . . restrict any government entity 
or official from sending to, or receiving from, the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service information regarding the citizenship or 
immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual.”7 
Though the moniker of sanctuary jurisdiction encompasses a range 
of practices in a range of places, DHS-identified sanctuary 
jurisdictions resist the enlarging enforcement-related goals of the 
federal government. For example, sanctuaries resist the expansion 
of priorities from “criminal aliens” to include undocumented 
immigrants who possess little more than status violations and who 
would have been considered low priorities for removal in the past.8 
Sanctuary resistance might include: (1) barring investigation of 
                                                                                                     
 6. Trump Interior E.O., supra note 2, at 8799.  
 7. Id.; see City of Philadelphia v. Sessions, No. 17-3894, 2018 WL 2725503, 
at *33 (E.D. Pa. June 6, 2018) (“Because Section 1373 violates the Tenth 
Amendment of the Constitution, the City is entitled to a declaratory judgment on 
Count VI of its Amended Complaint.”). The term “sanctuary” or “sanctuary city” 
is not defined in the Executive Order. 
 8. Christopher N. Lasch et al., Understanding “Sanctuary Cities”, 59 B.C. 
L. REV. 1703, 1761 n.4 (2018). Advocates generally define sanctuary jurisdictions 
more broadly than the Interior E.O., emphasizing the concept of providing safe 
harbor to undocumented immigrants in the form of a protective shield or a 
welcoming, inclusive environment. 
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civil and criminal immigration violations by local law enforcement; 
(2) limiting compliance with immigration detainers and 
administrative immigration warrants; (3) refusing Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) access to local jails; (4) limiting 
local law enforcement’s disclosure of sensitive information; and 
(5) precluding local participation in joint operations with federal 
immigration enforcement.9  
Attorney General Jeff Sessions followed up on the Interior 
E.O. with letters of warning to sanctuary jurisdictions10 and with 
public speeches decrying the public safety risks introduced by 
noncooperation.11 In direct response, cities and states began to 
challenge the Department of Justice (DOJ) letters in court. These 
lawsuits principally claim that the Interior E.O. and DOJ attempt 
to withhold federal funding and condition federal grants on 
compliance with Section 1373, breach constitutional limits on the 
federal government’s powers under the Spending Clause and 
anti-commandeering doctrine.12 A few cities and states have 
                                                                                                     
 9. As of April 1, 2018, there have been seventy sanctuary issuances since 
Trump issued his Interior E.O. with the majority calling for stronger policies to 
protect immigrants. Analysis based on id. at 1736–52; Understanding “Sanctuary 
Cities”—Online Appendix, WESTMINSTER L. LIBR., 
http://libguides.law.du.edu/c.php?g=705342&p=5009807 (last updated June 6, 
2018) (last visited Sept. 26, 2018) (compiling the sanctuary policies consulted in 
writing Understanding “Sanctuary Cities”) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 10. See Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, Dep’t of Justice, Justice 
Department Sends Letters to 29 Jurisdictions Regarding Their Compliance with 
8 U.S.C. 1373 (Nov. 15, 2017) (noting the jurisdictions that “have primarily been 
found to have laws, policies, or practices that may violate 8 U.S.C. 1373”) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 11. See Jeff Sessions, Attorney Gen., Remarks About Carrying Out the 
President’s Immigration Priorities (Oct. 20, 2017) (stating that sanctuary policies 
“undermine the moral authority of law and undermine the safety of the 
jurisdictions that adopt them”); Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, Dep’t of 
Justice, Attorney General Sessions Announces Immigration Compliance 
Requirements for Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant Programs 
(Jul. 25, 2017) (“So called ‘sanctuary’ policies make all of us less safe because they 
intentionally undermine our laws and protect illegal aliens who have committed 
crimes.”); Jeff Sessions, Attorney Gen., Remarks on Sanctuary Jurisdictions 
(Mar. 27, 2017) (describing sanctuary policies as “mak[ing] our nation less safe 
by putting dangerous criminals back on our streets”). 
 12. See, e.g., Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497, 530–33 (N.D. 
Cal. 2017) (addressing separation of powers and Spending Clause issues); City of 
Chicago v. Sessions, 264 F. Supp. 3d 933, 946–49 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (addressing 
Spending Clause issues). 
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introduced legislation challenging the Interior E.O. Most 
prominently, the California Values Act13 declines to tell federal 
immigration officials when incarcerated noncitizens will be 
released from local jails (as required under the Secure 
Communities program reinstated by the Interior E.O.); refuses to 
detain immigrants for transfer to immigration enforcement; 
establishes safe zones near courthouses, public schools, and health 
facilities; and provides increased oversight and accountability of 
cooperation between local law enforcement and ICE.14 Litigation 
over these provisions is proceeding in court.15 
Implementation of the broad directive to execute U.S. 
immigration laws against “all removable aliens”16 has been more 
diffuse. As ICE Director Thomas Homan said: “There’s no 
population off the table . . . . If you’re in this country illegally, we’re 
looking for you and we’re going to apprehend you.”17 In a 
fulfillment of this promise, ICE conducted raids in neighborhoods 
across the country, sweeping into its dragnet immigrants 
conducting everyday affairs such as going to school and work and 
those complying with routine check-ins for stays of removal. The 
breadth of enforcement left noncitizens constantly worrying and 
wondering if they could be next. Boasts from the government that 
ICE is targeting noncooperating communities and immigrants’ 
rights activists intimidate and chill efforts to protect immigrants. 
Wavering policies toward DREAMers18 incite fear that the 
                                                                                                     
 13. California Values Act, CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 7284–7284.12. (West 2017) 
(effective Jan. 1, 2018). 
 14. See id. § 7284.6 (refusing California law enforcement agency cooperation 
with federal immigration enforcement on several matters).  
 15. See generally, e.g., United States v. California, 314 F. Supp. 3d 1077 
(E.D. Ca. 2018) (evaluating the validity of three state laws meant to aid 
undocumented immigrants). 
 16. Trump Interior E.O., supra note 2, at 8799. 
 17. Haley Sweetland Edwards, ‘No One is Safe.’ How Trump’s Immigration 
Policy is Splitting Families Apart, TIME (Mar. 8, 2018), 
http://time.com/longform/donald-trump-immigration-policy-splitting-families/ 
(last visited Sept. 26, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 18. See Joanna Walters, What Is DACA and Who Are the Dreamers?, 
GUARDIAN (Sept. 14, 2017, 11:30 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2017/sep/04/donald-trump-what-is-daca-dreamers (last visited Sept. 26, 
2018) (explaining that DACA recipients are known as DREAMers because DACA 
“was a compromise . . . after Congress failed to pass the so-called Development, 
Relief and Education for Alien Minors (Dream) Act”) (on file with the Washington 
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enforcement dragnet could sweep so broadly as to include those 
who were until recently designated low priorities or nontargets for 
enforcement. In short, the nonpriority enforcement agenda makes 
everyone a potential priority for removal and the randomness of its 
implementation amplifies its reach. 
Colleges, churches, and corporations have resisted the 
sanctuary provision by creating their own inclusive environments 
to protect noncitizens in their communities. Campuses are creating 
undocumented resource centers, issuing statements of solidarity 
for Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program 
students and international students, and fundraising for DACA 
renewal fees and legal counsel.19 Churches are offering food and 
shelter to undocumented immigrants.20 Corporations are 
protecting their employees from enforcement actions. These 
protective actions seek to do more than resist federal ICE raids. As 
with the sanctuary movements that preceded them, they appeal to 
nonlegal sources of morality, such as human dignity, in their effort 
to support noncitizens and seek to provide social support, economic 
opportunities, and a political voice for noncitizens in the 
community. 
As immigration scholars Pratheepan Gulasekaram and Rose 
Cuisson Villazor explain in their insightful article Sanctuary 
Networks, these emerging sites of resistance can be understood to 
operate as a “network” of challengers rather than isolated 
instances of jurisdictional pushback.21 The networked institutions 
resist several facets of federal enforcement, and their power 
resides in their collective efforts to blunt federal enforcement and 
welcome immigrants. As extralegal actors appealing to extralegal 
norms, these sites are constrained in several respects. They rely on 
                                                                                                     
and Lee Law Review).  
 19. See, e.g., Undocumented Student Program, U. CAL. BERKELEY, 
https://undocu.berkeley.edu/home/our-history/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2018) 
(detailing the undocumented student program available at the University of 
California at Berkeley) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 20. See Jason Hanna, Can Churches Provide Legal Sanctuary to 
Undocumented Immigrants?, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2017/02/17/us/ 
immigrants-sanctuary-churches-legality-trnd/index.html (last updated Feb. 27, 
2017) (last visited Sept. 26, 2018) (“[S]ince Trump was elected in November, the 
number of churches in the United States expressing willingness to offer sanctuary 
has doubled to 800.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 21. Villazor & Gulasekaram, supra note 1, at 33. 
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the soft power of media, purchasing power, and political influence 
on legal decisionmakers to make their claims. These claims may 
not be directed at the courtroom, nor will they necessarily prevail 
in a legal challenge. Gulasekaram and Villazor say “each type of 
sanctuary has an independent, normative value and legal 
justification, but the ability of each to protect undocumented 
immigrants is limited” when viewed in isolation.22 “Examined 
together, however, these public and private groups are forming a 
system that collaborates, formally in some contexts and informally 
in others, to collectively challenge the federal government’s 
claimed monopoly on setting immigration policy.”23 Social 
scientists might refer to this type of exertion of influence through 
a decentralized and decentered network as governance. Broadly 
speaking, “[g]overnance may be defined as organized efforts to 
manage the course of events in a social system.” 24 These organized 
efforts may utilize the means of soft power in the form of 
information, ideas, and financial and moral capital to influence 
immigration policy.25 The specific ends of resistance may vary: 
they may be disavowal of disagreeable immigration policy, support 
for a vulnerable community, the pursuit of a particular decision 
making process or policy, or the expression of an alternative vision 
for immigration policy.26 I seek to define that alternative vision for 
                                                                                                     
 22. Id. at 6. 
 23. Id. at 7. 
 24. Scott Burris et al., Changes in Governance: A Cross-Disciplinary Review 
of Current Scholarship, 41 AKRON L. REV. 1, 6 (2008) [hereinafter Changes in 
Governance]; see also Scott Burris et al., Nodal Governance, 30 AUSTL. J. LEGAL 
PHIL. 30, 30 (2005) [hereinafter Nodal Governance] (“Governance . . . is proving a 
useful rubric for thinkers and researchers in a number of fields who are interested 
in democracy, honest and efficient government, political stability and the rule of 
law.”); R.A.W. Rhodes, Policy Networks: A British Perspective, 2 J. THEORETICAL 
POL. 293, 297 (1990) (describing “sub-government” as a policy-making process in 
which the “distinction between government and non-government becomes 
blurred”). For general history of governance, see generally Orly Lobel, New 
Governance as Regulatory Governance, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF GOVERNANCE 
(David Levi-Four, ed. 2012). 
 25. See KURT A. STRASSER, MYTHS AND REALITIES OF BUSINESS 
ENVIRONMENTALISM: GOOD WORKS, GOOD BUSINESS OR GREENWASH? 78 (2011) 
(“‘Soft law’ methods depend upon the power of social and institutional norms, 
information, and transparency to mobilize voluntary compliance.”). 
 26. See generally Nodal Governance, supra note 24. Of course, not all states 
and localities share the purpose of resisting Trump policies, let alone shared 
means. See MARGIE MCHUGH, MIGRATION POLICY INST., IN THE AGE OF TRUMP: 
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national immigration policy—distinct from state or local 
immigration policy—in the next section by elaborating on the 
concept of “integrative enforcement.” 
III. Integrative Enforcement 
Building on the resistance function of sanctuary networks, 
this section elaborates on the norm-creation function of sanctuary 
networks by specifying their substantive content and end goal. 
Integrative enforcement is premised on regulation of community 
membership according to terms that extend beyond federal 
immigration laws. Breaking outside of the terms of the federal 
immigration statute and Interior E.O. leads to localized and 
decentralized policymaking that emphasizes integrative goals and 
recognizes the multiple facets of noncitizen belonging in a 
community. These premises constitute what I call “integrative 
enforcement.”  
Integrative enforcement, expanded on in my in-progress book 
Constructing Citizenship for Noncitizens, reflects an emerging 
vision of integrative enforcement that presents an alternative to 
the federal government’s focus on exclusion and enforcement on 
the basis of one’s formal status as a noncitizen.27 Sanctuary 
networks engaged in articulating the norm of integrative 
enforcement seek to define who belongs in a community,28 and 
what forms of relief should be available to those who do not 
belong.29 On the question of who belongs, integrative enforcement 
                                                                                                     
POPULIST BACKLASH AND PROGRESSIVE RESISTANCE CREATE DIVERGENT STATE 
IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION CONTEXTS 2–9 (2018) (detailing the “numerous fronts” of 
immigration policy being contested such as refugee resettlement, education, and 
health and social services).  
 27. See generally MING H. CHEN, CONSTRUCTING CITIZENSHIP FOR 
NONCITIZENS (forthcoming Stanford University Press 2020). 
 28. See Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and 
Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 397–400 (2006) (discussing “membership 
theory” as it relates to immigration law: “immigration law embod[ies] choices 
about who should be members of society: individuals whose characteristics or 
actions make them worthy of inclusion in the national community”). 
 29. See generally Jason Cade, Sanctuaries as Equitable Delegation in an Era 
of Mass Immigration Enforcement, 113 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3053609; see Amanda Frost, 
Cooperative Enforcement in Immigration Law, 103 IOWA L. REV. 1, 29–38 (2017) 
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in a sanctuary infuses the federal immigration enforcement 
version of belonging with elements of broader membership 
regulation, e.g. those who reside in a community possess social, 
economic, and to some extent political ties to the U.S.30 As to the 
question of claims to relief, noncitizens are entitled to institutional 
protection and provision that goes beyond what is mandatory 
under federal law.31 They are entitled to similar claims of 
membership and as citizens residing in their communities.32 
IV. Trump’s Interior E.O. and Sanctuary Jurisdictions 
The primary example of sanctuary networks is the sanctuary 
city movement. In the lawsuits brought by sanctuary jurisdictions, 
the San Francisco City Attorney who filed the City and County of 
San Francisco v. Trump33 lawsuit, Dennis Herrera, said in a press 
release: 
I’m grateful that we’ve been able to protect billions of dollars 
that help some of the most vulnerable Americans. We’re talking 
about low-income families, seniors, foster children and people 
with disabilities. This is money that helps provide food, health 
care and a roof over their heads . . . . Let me be clear. San 
Francisco follows federal immigration law . . . . But our 
teachers, doctors and police officers cannot be conscripted into 
becoming immigration agents . . . .34 
This quote reveals that San Francisco’s reason for noncooperation 
is due to a distinctive notion of community membership and not 
merely disagreement over the legality of the Interior E.O. As he 
explained during a U.C. Berkeley Federalism Now panel: 
                                                                                                     
(discussing different forms of relief such as “cancellation of removal” and “U 
visas”). 
 30. See generally CHEN, supra note 27.  
 31. Id.  
 32. See Frost, supra note 29, at 29–32 (describing options for cancellation of 
removal).  
 33. Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497, 530–33 (N.D. Cal. 
2017). 
 34. Court Rules Trump’s Sanctuary Executive Order Is Unconstitutional, 
CITY ATT’Y S.F. (Nov. 20, 2017), https://www.sfcityattorney.org/2017/11/20/court-
rules-trumps-sanctuary-executive-order-unconstitutional/ (last visited Sept. 26, 
2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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It is not just about throwing down the gun of coercive federalism 
in order to say, “hey, don’t make me disobey the Constitution.” 
It’s about taking a stand and saying “this federal policy is 
inconsistent with our local values.” It is about the California 
versus Trump mindset on immigration.35  
Similarly, Chicago mayor Rahm Emanuel defends his city’s 
challenge to the Interior E.O. and DOJ sanctions for 
noncooperation with federal enforcement policy in broad terms:  
We want you to come to Chicago if you believe in the American 
dream . . . . By forcing us, or the police department, to choose 
between the values of the city and the philosophy of the police 
department, in community policing, I think it's a false choice 
and it undermines our actual safety agenda.36 
As previously described, the California Values Act steps up the 
fight to protect immigrants with criminal histories who are subject 
to enforcement actions by declining to notify federal immigration 
officials when noncitizens will be released from local jails and 
affirmatively providing safe zones.37 It seeks to advance improved 
governance over immigration enforcement through increased 
oversight and accountability of local-federal cooperation on 
enforcement.38 Beyond legal argument, the justification for these 
bold actions is that the California “[l]egislature finds and 
declares . . . [that] [i]mmigrants are valuable and essential 
members of the California community. Almost one in three 
Californians is foreign born and one in two children in California 
has at least one immigrant parent.”39  
                                                                                                     
 35. Dennis J. Herrera, S.F City Attorney, Speech at the U.C. Berkely 
Conference: Federalism Now (Nov. 3, 2017). 
 36. Daniella Diaz & Laura Jarrett, Chicago Mayor Defends Lawsuit Against 
DOJ Over Sanctuary City Status, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2017/08/07/politics/ 
rahm-emanuel-doj-sanctuary-city-cnntv/index.html (last updated Aug. 7, 2017) 
(last visited Sept. 26, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 37. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 7284.6 (West 2018) (“California law enforcement 
agencies shall not . . . for immigration enforcement purposes . . . [p]rovid[e] 
information regarding a person’s release date . . . .”).  
 38. Id.  
 39. Id.; Tim Henderson, As Sanctuary State, California Takes Deportation 
Fight to New Level, PEW TR.: STATELINE REP. (Oct 23, 2017), 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2017/10/23/as-
sanctuary-state-california-takes-deportation-fight-to-new-level (last visited Sept. 
26, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Some conservative 
communities have opted out of the California Values Act. See Roxana Kopetman, 
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A. Opposition to DACA Rescission and Enforcement on Campuses 
Campuses seek to provide a safe place for a broad range of 
noncitizens vulnerable to aggressive enforcement under the 
Interior E.O.’s zero tolerance enforcement strategy.40 Campuses 
providing a safe space for undocumented students are part of a 
broader movement in universities to protect vulnerable students.41 
This movement is broad and has a range of goals that include 
noncooperation with law enforcement.42 However, they are not 
                                                                                                     
Los Alamitos Votes to Opt Out of California Sanctuary Law, ORANGE COUNTY 
REG., https://www.ocregister.com/2018/03/19/los-alamitos-immigration-debate-
sparks-singing-shouting/ (last updated Mar. 21, 2018) (last visited Sept. 26, 2018) 
(discussing an example of one community rejecting the sanctuary law) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 40. See Geoffrey A. Hoffman, The Non-Priority Priorities, IMMIGR. PROF 
BLOG, (Feb. 14, 2017), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration/2017/02/the-
non-priorities-priorities-by-geoffrey-a-hoffman.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2018) 
(“[T]he [enforcement] ‘priorities’ do not protect most and perhaps not any 
undocumented person, since asylum seekers, crime victims, children and others 
with valid claims for relief are left wholly unprotected.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 41. The American Association of University Professors played a key role in 
organizing and publicizing the movement, stating:  
Of special importance is the status of those among our students who 
are undocumented, many of whom have been in this country since early 
childhood. Concern for the welfare of these students has already 
prompted a rash of petitions calling on colleges and universities to 
become “sanctuary campuses.” We support the movement for 
sanctuary campuses. 
The Atmosphere on Campus in the Wake of the Election, AM. ASS’N U. PROFESSORS, 
https://www.aaup.org/news/atmosphere-campus-wake-elections#.W4g6EtJKiUk 
(last visited Oct. 2, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review; see 
also Sanctuary Campus Movement, AM. ASS’N U. PROFESSORS, 
https://www.aaup.org/issues/sanctuary-campus-movement (last visited Sept. 26, 
2018) (“The sanctuary campus movement calls on campuses to provide a safe 
space for undocumented students.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). In comparison, other campuses have deflected the sanctuary label. For 
example, Emory University said in a public statement, “Emory is not seeking to 
establish itself as a sanctuary campus, for which there is no legal definition.” Julia 
Preston, Campuses Wary of Offering ‘Sanctuary’ to Undocumented Students, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/26/education/edlife/ 
sanctuary-for-undocumented-students.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2018) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 42. See Colleen Flaherty, Values for the Trump Era, INSIDE HIGHER ED, 
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2016/11/30/philosopher-proposes-code-con 
duct-academics-mit-professors-affirm-commitment-shared (last updated 
November 30, 2016) (last visited Sept. 26, 2018) (listing the 10-point 
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limited to that goal. They also include generalized sensitivity 
toward undocumented students and the generation of monetary, 
academic, psychological, and potentially legal support for their 
pursuit of education. The range and extent of the programs varies 
on each campus, with public universities more constrained than 
private universities in many cases—for example, Columbia and 
Wesleyan have taken bolder stances and been more forceful in 
refusing access to their campuses than public universities who are 
state employees bound by 8 U.S.C. § 1373.43 Even though both 
private and public campuses benefit from traditions of judicial 
deference to educational institutions on First Amendment 
grounds, federal statutes such as FERPA44 require campuses to 
protect student privacy, and there is no federal obligation to collect 
information about undocumented students. 
Campus commitments to integrative enforcement are vivid on 
campuses opposing the rescission of the DACA. Initiated in 2012 
by President Obama, DACA was designed to ameliorate harshness 
in the immigration enforcement regime and provide a measure of 
protection and security to long-time permanent residents who 
migrated without status as children.45 DACA improved the lives of 
undocumented immigrants as much as it irked opponents.46 It 
                                                                                                     
“Anti-Authoritarian Academic Code of Conduct” proposed by a University of Toronto 
professor).  
 43. See Undocumented Students and DACA, COLUM. UNDERGRADUATE 
ADMISSIONS, https://undergrad.admissions.columbia.edu/apply/first-year/un 
documented-students (last visited Sept. 26, 2018) (detailing how Columbia assists 
undocumented individuals to apply and be eligible for financial aid) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review); Admission & Financial Aid Information 
for Undocumented Students, WESLEYAN U., http://www.wesleyan.edu/admission/ 
apply/undocdaca.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2018) (noting that students with or 
without DACA can apply to Wesleyan) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 44. Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2012). 
 45. See Jerry Markon & Sandhya Somashekhar, Obama’s 2012 DACA Move 
Offers a Window into Pros and Cons of Executive Action, WASH. POST (Nov. 30, 
2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/obamas-2012-daca-move-offers-
a-window-into-pros-and-cons-of-executive-action/2014/11/30/88be7a36-7188-
11e4-893f-86bd390a3340_story.html?utm_term=.d98fd0ee9ef3 (last visited Sept. 
26, 2018) (“The 2012 initiative has given temporary protection to slightly more 
than 700,000 people brought to the United States illegally as children.”) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 46. See id. (stating that many undocumented children praise DACA for 
helping “them emerge from the shadows, making possible a work permit, a Social 
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became a lightning rod for Obama’s immigration policies such that 
conservative state governors and attorney generals challenged the 
program’s close companion, Deferred Action for Parental 
Accountability, in Texas v. United States47 in 2014 and threatened 
to challenge DACA if President Trump did not withdraw it in Fall 
2017.48 On September 5, 2017, President Trump withdrew the 
program.49 Multiple lawsuits in California, New York, 
Washington, D.C., Maryland, and Virginia challenged the DACA 
rescission on an expanded conception of the constitutional and 
administrative due process owed to noncitizens.50 Simultaneously, 
ongoing effort is being directed at lobbying Congress to pass 
legislation that would provide a pathway to citizenship for 
DREAMers.51 On the ground, immigration advocates are seeking 
                                                                                                     
Security number and enhanced self-respect”). 
 47. 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016). 
 48. See James Barragán, Paxton Threatens to Sue Over Immigration 
Program if Trump Does Not Rescind It, DALL. NEWS, (June 29, 2017), 
https://www.dallasnews.com/news/immigration/2017/06/29/paxton-threatens-
sue- daca-trump-rescind-program (last visited Sept. 26, 2018) (“Texas Attorney 
General Ken Paxton and a 10-state coalition have threatened to sue the federal 
government over an Obama-era program that protects unauthorized immigrants 
if it is not rescinded by September.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).  
 49. DHS Memorandum on Rescission of Deferred Action for Childhood 
Arrivals, DEP’T HOMELAND SECURITY (Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.dhs.gov/news/ 
2017/09/05/memorandum-rescission-daca (last visited Sept. 26, 2018) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 50. See generally Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 279 
F. Supp. 3d 1011 (N.D. Cal. 2018); Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen, 279 F. Supp. 3d 401 
(E.D.N.Y. 2018); Casa de Maryland v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 284 F. Supp. 3d 
758 (D. Md. 2018); NAACP v. Trump, 298 F. Supp. 3d 209 (D.D.C. 2018); 
Complaint, Trustees of Princeton v. United States, No. 1:17-CV-02325 (D.D.C. 
2017); Complaint, Park v. Sessions, No. 1:17-CV-01332 (E.D. Va. 2017). On 
January 9, 2018, the first federal court enjoined the DACA rescission. The Trump 
Administration has appealed, and the litigation remains in progress. See Order 
Denying FRCP 12(b)(1) Dismissal and Granting Provisional Relief, Regents of the 
Univ. of Cal. v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 3:17-CV-05211 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 
2017), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/4345906/1-9-18-DACA-Opinion. 
pdf. 
 51. Tal Kopan, DACA Alive, Barely, a Year After Trump Ended It, CNN, 
https://www.cnn.com/2018/09/05/politics/daca-one-year-end-anniversary-future/ 
index.html (last updated Sept. 5, 2018) (last visited Sept. 26, 2018) (“Both the 
House and Senate [have] tried and failed in the past year to pass legislation that 
would have preserved DACA . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).  
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to stabilize the legal status of DREAMers through a variety of 
affirmative means: fundraising for legal assistance with DACA 
renewals, pursuit of alternative relief, filing adjustment of status 
petitions, rallies in solidarity with undocumented students, and 
political pressure on Congress.52  
From the start, immigration law has included equitable 
exceptions for categories of immigrants such as DREAMers.53 
DACA was an integrative program lodged within a federal 
enforcement program. Its goals were to temper federal excess 
around deportation and the erosion of equities. The campus and 
community resistance to DACA’s rescission has focused on both 
elements as well. Campuses and communities rally around 
DREAMers who will be vulnerable to nonprioritized immigration 
enforcement once their protection ends, and they fundraise for pro 
bono legal assistance and pop-up clinics to renew DACA 
applications or screen for alternative forms of relief. 
Simultaneously, urgent and bipartisan appeals are being made for 
Congress to redouble their efforts for a judicial and legislative 
remedy for DREAMers.54 For example, Janet Napolitano, the 
President of the University of California system and former DHS 
Secretary issued this statement: “The University and the state of 
California stand together in our belief that students should be 
admitted to U.C. and other institutions of higher education based 
on their records of achievement and without regard to their 
                                                                                                     
 52. See, e.g., Letter from Peter McPherson, President, Ass’n of Pub. & 
Land-grant Univs., to Paul Ryan, Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, 
Mitch McConnell, U.S. Senate Majority Leader, Nancy Pelosi, U.S. House of 
Representatives Minority Leader, Charles Schumer, U.S. Senate Minority Leader 
(Sept. 5 2018) (urging Republican and Democratic leaders in Congress to pass 
DACA legislation) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 53. Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Outside the Law, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 
2037, 2087–89 (2008) (discussing prosecutorial discretion as a form of 
“discretionary relief,” among other equitable measures, such as stay of removal). 
 54. See Brian Bennet & Lisa Mascaro, Bipartisan Senate Effort to Protect 
Dreamers Collapses After Trump Threatens Veto, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2018), 
http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-immigration-trump-20180215-story.html 
(last visited Sept. 26, 2018) (noting that both parties have pushed for pro-
DREAMer legislation, but they have been thwarted by Trump’s threats) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Congress has tried to pass a DREAM 
Act for the last ten years. Several proposals were under consideration, but none 
passed prior to the scheduled expiration of the DACA program on March 5, 2018, 
or passage of the budget. 
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immigration status.”55 After outlining several measures her 
university will take to support undocumented students, including 
in-state tuition, a DREAMer financial aid program, legal services, 
campus-based student service centers, and directing campus police 
not to contact, detain, question or arrest individuals based on 
suspected undocumented status or enter agreements to undertake 
joint efforts to make arrests for federal immigration law violations, 
she explains that the U.C. system will explore additional options 
in their “fight to keep the program alive.”56 This fight extended to 
a lawsuit that temporarily enjoined the DACA rescission.57 
Following the Northern District of California injunction,58 U.C. 
President Napolitano said: 
[E]ven with this decision, fear and uncertainty persist for DACA 
recipients across California and the nation who want to 
continue to live, work, learn and contribute to the country they 
know as home. It does not negate, nor lessen, the urgent need 
for permanent protection through a legislative solution. UC’s 
DACA students represent the very best of our country and are 
a key part of California and our nation's future. They are 
studying to be doctors, teachers and engineers and working to 
solve the greatest scientific and technological challenges of our 
time.59  
Federal courts in New York, Maryland, and Washington, D.C. have 
since issued similar injunctions of the DACA rescission, while a 
                                                                                                     
 55. UC President Napolitano Denounces Decision to End DACA Program, 
Calls on Congress to Make Protections Permanent, U. CAL. (Sept. 5, 2017), 
https://www.universityofcalifornia.edu/press-room/uc-president-napolitano-
statement-decision-end-daca-program (last visited Sept. 26, 2018) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 56. Id. 
 57. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. C 
17-05211 WHA, 2017 WL 4642324, at *55 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2017) (order 
granting motion to complete administrative record) (granting relief from DACA 
rescission to allow the Department of Homeland Security to “complete the 
administrative record” because it “excluded highly relevant materials”).  
58. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 279 F. Supp. 
3d 1011, 1048 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (enjoining the defendant to maintain the DACA 
program on a nationwide basis). 
 59. UC Statement on Federal Court’s DACA Ruling, U. CAL. DAVIS (Jan. 9, 
2018), https://www.ucdavis.edu/news/uc-statement-federal-court%E2%80%99s-
daca-ruling/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
SANCTUARY NETWORKS 1377 
federal court in Texas is seeking to reinstate it.60 Congressional 
reform remains possible, but it is losing steam.61 The fate of the 
DACA program and DREAMers will require resolution of these 
split legal challenges in courts and Congress,62 and the broader 
battle to reshape acceptance of the need to protect DACA recipients 
will continue in the network of campuses and communities. 
B. Opposition to Expanding Enforcement in Churches 
For churches providing sanctuary to undocumented 
immigrants, who are often members of mixed status families that 
would be divided with deportation, protecting immigrants means 
providing a literal safe haven from enforcement. While church 
buildings are not exempt from immigration laws, they 
traditionally have fallen into the category of sensitive areas and 
avoided target enforcement.63 In Denver, five immigrants sought 
                                                                                                     
 60. See Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen, 279 F. Supp. 3d 401, 436 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) 
(calling defendant’s decision to rescind DACA an “arbitrary and capricious action” 
because defendants “erroneously concluded that the program was 
unconstitutional and unlawful”); Casa de Md. v. Trump, 284 F. Supp. 3d 758 (D. 
Md. 2018); NAACP v. Trump, 298 F. Supp. 3d 209 (D.D.C. 2018); cf. Texas v. 
United States, No. 1:18-cv-00068, 2018 WL 4178970 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 31, 2018) 
(evaluating state challenges to DACA reinstatement).  
 61. Hopes began to fade once Congress failed to pass legislation in time for 
the March 5, 2018 deadline for DACA rescission. See Ali Rogan & Mariam Khan, 
Dreamers Deferred as Congress Lets DACA Deadline Pass, ABCNEWS (Mar. 5, 
2018, 5:48 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/dreamers-deferred-congress-lets-
daca-deadline-pass/story?id=53464924 (last visited Sept. 26, 2018) (“Senate 
Majority Leader Mitch McConnell also made it clear after the failed Senate votes 
that he would only be willing to bring to the floor DACA solutions that can pass 
both the House and the Senate . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 62. The Supreme Court declined to review the cases ahead of Ninth Circuit 
and Second Circuit appellate review. See Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the 
Univ. of Ca., 138 S. Ct. 1182 (2018) (mem.) (denying certiorari); Order List: 583 
U.S., SUP. CT. U.S., (Feb. 26, 2018) https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders 
/022618zor_j426.pdf (denying certiorari and assuming “that the Court of Appeals will 
proceed expeditiously to decide this case”). 
 63. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENF’T, 
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS AT OR FOCUSED ON SENSITIVE LOCATIONS 1 (2011) (“[The] 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) policy regarding certain 
enforcement actions by ICE officers and agents . . . is designed to ensure that 
these enforcement actions do not occur at nor are focused on sensitive locations 
such as schools and churches . . . .”). 
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church-based sanctuary in the midst of intensifying enforcement 
that threatened their protective shield.64 Unlike sanctuary 
jurisdictions, campuses and churches are nongovernmental 
institutions whose actions rely on soft power and creative 
provisions to refashion federal immigration policy. They seek to 
exert their influence subtly and indirectly. They claim that their 
sought-after ends are normatively desirable, even if not legally 
mandatory. They rely on societal norms and appeals to morality, 
rather than legal argument and courthouses. A sanctuary coalition 
of churches abides by a pledge that draws on both civic and moral 
grounds for supporting immigrants and opposing immigration 
policies. 
As people of faith and people of conscience, we pledge to resist 
the newly elected administration’s policy proposals to target 
and deport millions of undocumented immigrants and 
discriminate against marginalized communities. We will open 
up our congregations and communities as sanctuary spaces for 
those targeted by hate, and work alongside our friends, families, 
and neighbors to ensure the dignity and human rights of all 
people . . . . As people of faith and people of conscience, we will 
take civil initiative out of our moral obligation to embody 
principles of human rights and dignity and resist any harmful 
and unjust policy proposals that further undermine due process 
and lead to racial profiling and discrimination . . . we are ready 
to open the doors of our sacred spaces and accompany those 
facing deportation and discrimination . . . we support those 
answering the call to provide sanctuary at schools, hospitals, 
college campuses, and family homes.65 
The high profile resistance of First Baptist Church in Denver, 
the church providing sanctuary to Jeannette Vizguerra that led to 
                                                                                                     
 64. See Jenn Fields, Colorado Has More People Living in Church Sanctuary 
than Any Other State, DENVER POST (Oct. 25, 2017), 
http://www.denverpost.com/2017/10/25/colorado-undocumented-immigrants-in-
church-sanctuary/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2018) (“No other state has as many 
people living in a church or temple to avoid deportation. One in every six people 
in sanctuary in the United States is in Colorado.”) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). The most famous is Jeanette Vizguerra, a mother of four 
children who received a stay of deportation after eighty-six days residing in a 
church. 
 65. We Pledge to Resist Deportation and Discrimination Through Sanctuary, 
GROUNDSWELL, https://action.groundswell-mvmt.org/petitions/we-pledge-to-
resist-deportation-and-discrimination-through-sanctuary (last visited Sept. 26, 
2018) (emphasis added) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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her obtaining a two-year stay of removal, was marked by Vizguerra 
and volunteers wearing t-shirts at her release saying “Keep 
Families Together.”66 Her church shares with other churches in 
pro-immigrant and anti-immigrant jurisdictions the common 
purpose of acting on a moral calling to engage in civic action that 
imagines a more humane, integrative immigration enforcement 
policy. Hers is potentially more willing to adopt a civic stance that 
directly confronts the government given that Denver is 
pro-immigrant and has adopted sanctuary city policies. 
Nationwide, the bolder churches publicly declare their sanctuary 
stance in defiance of anti-harboring provisions in the INA, on the 
theory that the publicity creates a shield against liability since 
they are not acting in secret, or avail themselves of religious 
freedom guarantees such as Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
and the First Amendment.67 In jurisdictions that are less 
sympathetic to immigrants, churches buffer their moral impetus 
with less direct civic engagement—for example, by insisting on 
search warrants before letting ICE enter their sanctuaries or 
keeping quiet their offers of sanctuary to immigrants fearing 
deportation—to reduce friction in their communities.68 So far 
                                                                                                     
 66. See Noelle Phillips, Jeanette Vizguerra Leaves Sanctuary After 86 Days 
Avoiding Immigration Authorities, DENVER POST (May 12, 2017), https://www 
.denverpost.com/2017/05/12/jeanette-vizguerra-arturo-hernandez-garcia-stay-
deportation/ (last updated May 12, 2017) (last visited Sept. 26, 2018) (“Vizguerra 
left First Baptist Church in Denver Friday morning with about two dozen 
supporters singing a song in Spanish . . . . Vizguerra’s story has generated 
international headlines and prompted TIME magazine last month to name her 
one of the magazine’s 100 most influential people in the world.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 67. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting 
the free exercise [of religion] . . . .”); Jason Hanna, Can Churches Provide Legal 
Sanctuary to Undocumented Immigrants?, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/
2017/02/17/us/immigrants-sanctuary-churches-legality-trnd/index.html (last 
updated Feb. 17, 2017) (last visited Sept. 26, 2018) (discussing “the Immigration 
and Nationality Act prohibit[ing] anyone from knowingly harboring an 
undocumented immigrant” but finding that “[i]n general, prosecutors probably 
won’t go after a pastor” for fear of bad publicity) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review).   
 68. See Hanna, supra note 67 (“Offering sanctuary at a church can involve 
providing food and shelter for an immigrant, as well as staffing volunteers to stay 
with that person around the clock.”).  
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under the Trump Administration, no sanctuary churches have 
confronted a legal challenge.69 
C. Corporations Resisting Worksite Enforcement, DACA, and 
Travel Ban 
Just as powerful, if less visible, was the outcry from Google, 
Apple, Facebook, Uber, Lyft, and other technology companies 
against restrictive immigration policies.70 These technology 
companies opposed the first travel ban almost immediately and 
were joined by more than 150 companies who issued public 
statements, social media pressure, and eventually an amicus brief 
in the lawsuit proceeding against the travel bans.71 Facebook 
C.E.O. Mark Zuckerberg posted at the time, “[m]y great 
grandparents came from Germany, Austria and Poland. [My wife] 
Priscilla's parents were refugees from China and Vietnam. The 
United States is a nation of immigrants, and we should be proud 
of that.”72 Apple reminded consumers that founder Steve Jobs’ 
                                                                                                     
 69. Nonenforcement in churches is in keeping with ICE’s policy to treat 
churches as sensitive locations, though the policy is nonbinding on ICE. See FAQ 
on Sensitive Locations and Courthouse Arrests, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS 
ENFORCEMENT, https://www.ice.gov/ero/enforcement/sensitive-loc (last updated 
Jan. 31, 2018) (last visited Sept. 26, 2018) (discussing ICE policy related to 
immigration enforcement in “sensitive locations” such as schools and churches) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS 
ENF’T, ICE DIRECTOR MEMORANDUM ON ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS AT OR FOCUSED ON 
SENSITIVE LOCATIONS (2011), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/ero-outreach/pdf/10029.2-
policy.pdf (same).  
 70. See Don Reisinger, Major Tech Companies Line Up Against Travel Ban, 
FORTUNE MAG. (April 20, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/04/20/tech-company-
travel-ban/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2018) (discussing technology companies’ brief 
opposing “Trump’s latest travel ban”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). More travel ban responses: Uber boycott/CEO resignation, Lyft $1 
million to ACLU, Starbucks hiring 10,000 refugees. 
 71.  See Brief of Technology Companies as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Appellees, Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017) 
(No. 17-1351) (arguing that Trump’s Executive Order is unlawful and noting that 
“[i]mmigrants or their children founded more than 200 of the companies on the 
Fortune 500 list, including Apple”).  
 72. Mark Zuckerberg, FACEBOOK (Jan. 27, 2017), https://www.facebook. 
com/zuck/posts/10103460278231481?pnref=story (last visited Sept. 26, 2018) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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father immigrated from Syria.73 The same companies have adopted 
in-house policies for hiring DACA recipients with work permits 
and have made public statements opposing the DACA rescission.74 
Technology companies have long been protective of foreign workers 
who are vital to their businesses. Thus, it is no surprise they have 
supported H1-B visas and resisted restrictive employment laws 
that dampen foreign competition such as the Hire America, Buy 
America Executive Order.75 Start-up executive (Y Combinator) 
said:  
Silicon Valley is stepping up. The companies are working on 
three fronts: They are vociferously objecting to the Trump 
policies they think are bad, they are trying to engage with him 
to influence his behavior, and they are developing new 
technology to work against policies and political discourse they 
don’t support.76  
Less formally, tech companies facilitate the use of texting and 
social media to warn immigrants of imminent raids and software 
                                                                                                     
 73. See Simon Jary, Who Is Steve Jobs’ Syrian Immigrant Father, 
MACWORLD (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.macworld.co.uk/feature/apple/who-is-
steve-jobs-syrian-immigrant-father-abdul-fattah-jandali-3624958/ (last visited 
Sept. 26, 2018) (“While some people are horrified at the numbers fleeing 
Syria, . . . many have pointed out that previous Syrian migrants have boosted the 
West’s culture, business and technology—most notably the biological father of 
Steve Jobs—Abdul Fattah Jandali . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 74. See Microsoft President to Trump: To Deport a DREAMer, You’ll Have to 
Go Through Us, NPR (Sept. 5, 2017, 4:21 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2017/09/05/548686695/250-apple-employees-among-thousands-at-risk-from-
daca-cancellation (last visited Sept. 26, 2018) (“Dozens of CEOs including Jeff 
Bezos of Amazon, Reed Hastings from Netflix, Randall Stephenson from AT&T 
and Tim Sloan of Wells Fargo wrote a letter addressed to the president asking 
him to preserve [DACA]”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 75. See An Open Letter From Technology Sector Leaders on Donald Trump’s 
Candidacy for Presidency, NEWCO SHIFT (July 14, 2016),  
https://shift.newco.co/an-open-letter-from-technology-sector-leaders-on-donald-
trumps-candidacy-for-president-5bf734c159e4 (last visited Sept. 26, 2018) (“We 
are inventors, entrepreneurs, engineers, investors, researchers, and business 
leaders working in the technology sector . . . . We believe in an inclusive country 
that fosters opportunity, creativity and a level playing field. Donald Trump does 
not.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 76. David Streitfeld, Tech Opposition to Trump Propelled by Employees, Not 
Executives, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/06/ 
business/trump-travel-ban-apple-google-face book.html?_r=0 (last visited Sept. 
26, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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apps to circumvent cell phone surveillance at borders.77 The 
Chamber of Commerce has set forward the Visit the U.S. Coalition 
to encourage international travelers to visit the U.S. and counter 
a Trump slump in tourism.78 
Corporate resistance extends beyond technology firms that 
rely on foreign workers for comparative advantage. Larger 
corporations, which tend to be more politically conservative, have 
expressed support for employees with DACA as part of their 
support for diversity in their corporate missions.79 Chobani and a 
cadre of independent coffee shops utilize targeted hiring and job 
training for refugees.80 Small companies and restaurants with 
immigrant workers are preparing to balance their obligations to 
comply with worksite laws and protecting workers who may 
become the target of worksite raids, e.g., union organizing and 
7-Eleven raids,81 through indirect opposition that enables workers 
                                                                                                     
 77. See Issie Lapowsky, A Portable Panic Button for Immigrants Swept Up 
in Raids, WIRED (March 10, 2017), https://www.wired.com/2017/03/portable-
panic-button-immigrants-swept-raids/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2018) (noting that an 
app has been created to “select contacts they would want to notify in case of 
emergency and pre-load personalized messages to each recipient”) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 78. See Who We Are, VISIT U.S. COALITION, https://www.visituscoalition.com/ 
(last visited Sept. 26, 2018) (explaining the Visit U.S. Coalition’s goals and 
policies) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 79. Goldman Sachs, Nike, Coca Cola, and Ford Motor Company adopted 
diversity statements. For example, Ford’s Executive Chairman Bill Ford said: 
“Respect for all people is a core value of Ford Motor Company, and we are proud 
of the rich diversity of our company here at home and around the world. That is 
why we do not support this policy or any other that goes against our values as a 
company.” See Diversity and Inclusion, FORD, https://corporate.ford.com/company 
/diversity.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2018) (stating that diversity has always been 
a key to Ford’s success) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 80. See Chobani Founder Stands By Hiring Refugees, 60 MINUTES (Apr. 6, 
2017), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/chobani-founder-stands-by-hiring-refugees/ 
(last visited Sept. 26, 2018) (providing jobs, transportation, and translators at 
Chobani plants for refugees) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 81. See Former Head of ICE Discusses Raids on 7-Eleven Stores, NPR (Jan. 
11, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/01/11/577453468/former-head-of-ice-
discusses-raids-on-7-eleven-stores (discussing ICE raids at 7-Eleven stores 
resulting in twenty-one arrests of illegal immigrants) (last visited Sept. 26, 2018) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). California Legislation AB 450 
and community organizations outline some employer resistance strategies that 
stay within the bounds of federal enforcement and protect immigrants, for 
example, by insisting on search warrants in private workspaces and providing 
legal assistance to workers.  
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to continue working as independent contractors or relying on 
franchise and other flexible corporate forms, hiring legal counsel 
and providing know your rights workshops in anticipation of 
worksite raids, invoking their private property rights to bar or 
monitor ICE access. Some of these protective measures are 
captured in California’s AB 450, which limits employer cooperation 
with ICE worksite enforcement, while most are adopted without 
mandatory state requirements.82 
V. Constructing Citizenship Through Integrative Enforcement 
To recap my argument, sanctuary networks exemplify the 
integrative enforcement ideal of shared governance over 
immigration policy. Sanctuary jurisdictions signify the value of 
immigrants as members of the community by recognizing the full 
range of contributions of immigrants. They do this instead of 
fixating on immigration status. More ambitiously, they express 
their recognition of their societal obligation to integrate citizens 
rather than viewing integration as a one-way process with the 
onus on immigrant individuals to conform to societal norms. They 
expect themselves to enact policies and practices consistent with 
these obligations, and they make demands on the federal 
government to participate in a shared project of integrative 
enforcement.  
For many, the norms and principles they seek to advance go 
beyond policy reforms and enforceable legal mandates: they state 
that noncitizens deserve protections of dignity and due process 
such as access to hospital emergency care, protection of courts, 
protection from splitting mixed-status families, the ability to 
                                                                                                     
 82. See CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 7285–7285.3 (West 2017) (“[T]he bill would 
prohibit an employer . . . from providing voluntary consent to an immigration 
enforcement agent to enter nonpublic areas of a place of labor . . . .”). Some 
businesses oppose Section 7285 of the California Government Code. For example, 
Motel 6 is accused of voluntarily providing guests’ personal information to ICE in 
six hotel locations. See Richard Gonzalez, Motel 6 Sued, Again, for Identifying 
Latino Guests to ICE, NPR (Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2018/01/23/580149434/motel-6-sued-for-identifying-latino-guests-for-immigration-
agents (last visited Sept. 26, 2018) (alleging that providing ICE with personal 
information violated “federal and state laws barring discrimination based on 
national origin, and protecting against unreasonable searches”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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express opinions and petition the government through protest, 
media, and appeals to elected officials. Noncitizens with criminal 
histories deserve to be considered part of the public safety equation 
who are seen as community members who might be victimized by 
crime and empowered to report it, rather than the source of public 
safety risks. Noncitizen students deserve educational access 
unencumbered by immigration enforcement in sensitive locations 
such as schools. Noncitizen workers deserve opportunities to work, 
workplace safety, and protections from discrimination, 
harassment, and unlawful raids. In other words, noncitizens 
deserve to be considered American socially and culturally, even if 
they lack formal legal status. Consistent with the slogan for Define 
America, a nonprofit dedicated to DREAMers, “We are Americans. 
Just not legally.”83  
Importantly, sanctuary networks go beyond articulating 
norms and policies of inclusion for themselves. They seek to shape 
the national conversation on immigration. This effort includes 
policy, but it is not limited to it; norm-setting extends through 
broad tactics and is directed at an array of normative ends. This is 
collectively how sanctuary networks advance an alternate vision 
for immigration that includes integration for the broader category 
of noncitizen workers, churchgoers, and community members 
rendered vulnerable under aggressive enforcement. 
Practically speaking, how do these principles translate into a 
national immigration policy of integrative enforcement? This Part 
distills the underlying principles that lie beneath the governance 
strategies and policies sought in sanctuary networks.  
A. Rebalancing the Federal Enforcement-Only Immigration 
Agenda to Include Integration 
Sanctuary networks are rethinking the federal government’s 
regulation of membership for noncitizens. The emphasis in federal 
immigration law for the last decade has been on enforcement of 
formal immigration status: preventing unlawful entry, barring 
access to work and public services, detaining those suspected of 
                                                                                                     
 83. We Are Americans, Just Not Legally, TIME (June 25, 2017), 
http://content.time.com/time/covers/0,16641,20120625,00.html (last visited Sept. 
26, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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lacking documentation, and deporting immigrants with minor 
crime and status violations. Immigration law gives little thought 
to immigrant integration in the United States Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (USCIS) monitored pathway to citizenship. 
It gives even less thought to integration in the strenuous push for 
deportation that has eliminated many of the remedies for unlawful 
status that previously permitted adjustment of status and 
adjudicative discretion that permitted consideration of 
proportionality in individualized cases.84  
Challenges to this asymmetric approach to immigration policy 
would require building a stronger infrastructure for integration. 
While such efforts are not confined to the federal level, they must 
include it because the federal government has distinctive 
capabilities as a gatekeeper to formal citizenship. Preserving 
integration at the federal level means encouraging the federal 
government’s few integrative spaces to remain committed to 
integration and discouraging the conflation of enforcement 
missions into those functions. Within the DHS, for example, the 
USCIS needs safeguarding of its statutory mission to grant visas, 
work permits, and other immigration benefits and strengthening 
of its community outreach functions to affirmatively assist with 
adjustments to status for newcomers, permanent residents, and 
U.S. citizens.85 USCIS should offer education for the next step to 
citizenship at each phase of naturalization (i.e. LPR applications 
at entry, naturalization applications at permanent residence). ICE 
and CBP need to recognize the potential for abuse if they encroach 
too heavily on USCIS’s functions, for example, the institution of 
                                                                                                     
 84. See Frost, supra note 29, at 29–36 (listing as examples cancellation of 
removal, U-visas, Special Immigration Juvenile Status Visas, and waivers and 
exceptions for unlawful presence); Cade, supra note 29, at 8 (discussing the ways 
in which sanctuary networks erect front-line equitable screens, promote 
procedural fairness, and act as last-resort circuit breakers in the administration 
of federal deportation law).   
 85. In contrast to the suggested approach, the USCIS in March 2018 
changed its mission statement to emphasize the efficient administration of 
immigration law and protection of Americans rather than service to noncitizens: 
“U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services administers the nation’s lawful 
immigration system, safeguarding its integrity and promise by efficiently and 
fairly adjudicating requests for immigration benefits while protecting Americans, 
securing the homeland, and honoring our values.” About Us, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & 
IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/aboutus (last updated Mar. 6, 2018) (last 
visited Sept. 26, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
1386 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1361 (2018) 
extreme vetting or taking people off the pathway to citizenship for 
technical problems with their green card or decades-old minor 
offenses.86 Outside DHS, civil rights agencies, workplace agencies, 
and law enforcement agencies can be held to account for adherence 
to statutory mandates to provide educational opportunity, fair 
workplaces, and community safety in a manner not conditioned on 
immigration status. Interagency task forces on language and 
national origin enable cooperation and sharing of best practices 
across those agencies and memoranda of agreements guard 
against harmful complicity such as FEMA denying emergency care 
to immigrants or the Department of Labor using information about 
worker immigration status to tip off ICE. A federal immigration 
office (outside of DHS and DOJ) can connect these efforts to the 
President’s policy priorities.  
Challenging the status quo would require networked sites to 
push for a re-examination of the federal government’s expanded 
notions of criminality, security, and immigration enforcement. 
Congress needs to alter the priorities for immigration enforcement 
and forge pathways to citizenship through legislative reform. 
Executive agencies need to widen opportunities for enforcement 
discretion and enable adjustment of status for those newly eligible 
to do so. Courts need to mitigate overly harsh administration of 
federal immigration laws by safeguarding due process for 
immigrants facing removal. The overarching idea is to rebalance 
enforcement-only status quo and to build national norms and 
policies of integration.87  
B. Connect Sanctuary Networks with National 
Immigration Policy 
State, local, and nonprofit organizations have led the way on 
immigrant integration with civics education workshops, cultural 
                                                                                                     
 86. Many policy changes show this encroachment, for example, see 
Memorandum from Rex Tillerson, Sec’y of State, Elaine Duke, Acting Sec’y, Dep’t 
Homeland Sec., Daniel Coats, Dir., Office of the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, to 
Donald Trump, President of the United States (Oct. 23, 2017) (applying extreme 
vetting to refugee and military veteran applications for legal permanent 
residence) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 87. See id. (providing an example of “enforcement-only” policy lacking 
integration efforts). 
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exchange, and language support that facilitate social integration 
and cultivate the development of skills and attitudes that facilitate 
economic integration.88 Private entities and individuals such as 
churches, corporations, and campuses are joining them. A goal of 
this Article has been to show how these decentralized efforts 
collectively temper federal enforcement excess and advance a 
vision for national immigration policy premised on shared 
responsibility for integration as a societal obligation rather than 
an optional exercise. This two-part function is the essence of 
sanctuary networks and integrative enforcement: speaking out for 
themselves and confronting the federal government.  
As the sanctuary network examples demonstrate, integration 
can proceed in an independent or in an intertwined fashion with 
federal immigration enforcement. These networks can focus on 
short-term policy change or articulate norms for long-term vision. 
While isolated efforts to integrate immigrants within 
communities, churches, and corporations are valuable for their 
own sake—often achieving what would be unachievable in another 
setting—I suggest that there is benefit to a more cohesive linking 
up of the national conversation on immigration. Community 
organizations that offer assistance with English language and 
civics tests and naturalization applications could frequent USCIS 
naturalization ceremonies and interviews that lead to permanent 
residence. Civics education and community protest or mobilizing 
opportunities could be paired with voter registration drives. Legal 
clinics providing free or low-fee legal assistance for immigrants 
seeking income security, lawful means for remaining within the 
country, or other forms of protection from deportation could be 
broadened to support those making the transition to citizenship, 
especially given that the pathway is increasingly riddled with 
tripwires for enforcement. The U.S. Refugee Admissions Program 
                                                                                                     
 88. For examples of scholarship on immigrant integration in the local 
context, see ELS DE GRAAUW, MAKING IMMIGRANT RIGHTS REAL: NONPROFITS AND 
THE POLITICS OF INTEGRATION IN SAN FRANCISCO (2016) (detailing how non-profits 
started to aid undocumented immigrants can achieve their goals in the face of 
inherent limitations); Stella Burch Elias, The New Immigration Federalism, 74 
OHIO ST. L.J. 703, 743 (2013) (“[S]tate and local immigrant-inclusionary 
rulemaking has begun to outstrip immigrant-exclusionary regulations.”); 
Cristina Rodriguez, Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 
MICH. L. REV. 567, 581–609 (2008) (providing several examples of states and 
localities providing services for immigration integration). 
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is one of a few models for linking federal and local integration 
efforts in a manner that goes beyond funding. The federal 
government handles refugee determinations and local 
organizations and nonprofits assist with resettlement, often with 
federal funding.89 AmeriCorps has a pilot program that places 
native-born U.S. volunteers in immigrant communities.90 A 
counterpart, RefugeeCorps, has been proposed to permit skill 
development and societal contribution that offsets cost, builds good 
will, and builds bridges to mainstream communities (similar to the 
military).91 Beyond specific policy prescriptions, sanctuary 
networks can advance a long-term vision for shared governance of 
immigration that includes multiple actors and not merely a contest 
of state versus local laws. 
C. Rethink Connection Between Enforcement and Citizenship as 
Membership in Society 
Taken together, the sanctuary networks highlighted in this 
Article reveal a culture of valuing immigrants as members of 
society and not merely bearers of status. This vision extends 
beyond short-term policy fixes. The overarching vision being set 
through their norm-setting recognizes the substantive experiences 
of immigrants—social, economic, cultural, and political—rather 
than fixating on their legal status in a way that is circumscribed 
by their lack of formal citizenship. U.S. immigration policy needs 
                                                                                                     
 89. See Memorandum from Rex Tillerson, supra note 86 (reviewing the U.S. 
Refugee Admissions Program and advising how to heighten vetting process). 
 90. USCRI Announces New Refugee AmeriCorps Program, USCRI (July 
2016), http://refugees.org/news/uscri-announces-new-refugee-americorps-program/ 
(last visited Sept. 26, 2018) (“[AmeriCorps] volunteers are crucial to providing 
refugee clients with English instruction, cultural orientation, mentoring, 
assistance with housing, employment, health care, and education, financial 
literacy, and many other services.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 91. See generally STRENGTHENING COMMUNITIES BY WELCOMING ALL 
RESIDENTS: A FEDERAL STRATEGIC ACTION PLAN ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE 
INTEGRATION, WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE ON NEW AMERICANS (2015), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/final_tf_newameric
ans_report_4-14-15_clean.pdf (discussing contributions of immigrants and 
presenting the president with a plan to “integrat[e] newcomers into the social, 
cultural, and economic fabric of our country”). 
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this type of reorientation to better balance integration and 
enforcement. While the federal government maintains sovereignty 
over the regulation of its borders and the composition of its 
membership, immigrants are part of the national community once 
they reside in the United States. Seeing immigrants as community 
members requires that society and government institutions share 
in the task of integration, particularly during the time when 
immigrants lack access to the full range of political and legal rights 
presumed to be preconditions for full belonging for other 
marginalized groups.92 For those undocumented immigrants who 
lack a pathway to legal status, the federal government’s assistance 
is needed to facilitate their transition to full belonging—legal 
reform to create a pathway, administrative support to access that 
pathway, and practical assistance to realize the benefits of 
pursuing it.  
Viewing immigrants as threats to extinguish, rather than 
community members to embrace, prevents the immigrants who are 
already living in the United States. from properly innovating and 
adapting to a diverse, global society. Integrative enforcement rests 
on a premise of linked fate among citizens and noncitizens. The 
U.S. military’s ability to cultivate a strong sense of substantive 
belonging for noncitizens who become eligible to naturalize 
through their national service models the cultivation of 
membership across legal status. The refugee program linking the 
federal government with churches and voluntary initiatives of 
private corporations to help refugees find jobs exemplify a 
multifaceted network of federal and local, public and private actors 
working toward economic integration. While these programs do not 
currently extend to all types of noncitizens, they build the societal 
conditions to make possible a political commitment to bettering the 
economic, political, social, and legal integration of noncitizens. 
Enforcement policies that limit migration, block integration, 
and permanently exclude noncitizens from joining society fuel 
societal division and ultimately prove self-defeating. Hostility 
toward immigrants breaks down the social fabric. The lost sense of 
                                                                                                     
 92. See CHEN, supra note 27 (describing government interventions to assist 
the naturalization process). See generally IRENE BLOEMRAAD, BECOMING A CITIZEN: 
INCORPORATING IMMIGRANTS AND REFUGEES IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 
(2006) (providing an interesting perspective on how the United States and 
Canada encourage foreigners to achieve citizenship). 
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fairness for those excluded from basic protections alienates 
individuals and corrodes government legitimacy. The resulting 
weakening of citizenship as an institution breeds threats to public 
safety and national security.93 Revitalizing the sense that 
citizenship is a shared exercise and a goal that is worth 
encouraging—rather than a birthright that is passively granted, 
denied, or removed at the hands of the federal 
government— reinvigorates the nation. Integration and 
enforcement are both needed, and they are not necessarily at odds. 
VI. Conclusion 
This Article has argued that integration is missing from the 
national conversation about immigration. Social networks of 
public and private institutions need to work together to construct 
new norms for the immigration agenda. The federal government, 
in particular, has a special responsibility to promote integration 
alongside the state, local, and non-governmental community 
groups that have traditionally served as the engines of integration. 
This is because the federal government is the gatekeeper to 
citizenship and formal citizenship is the coin of the realm in a 
political climate fixated on enforcement. 
Undoubtedly, the federal government’s dual responsibility for 
immigration enforcement and immigrant integration is vexing. 
However, the federal government’s nearly exclusive focus on status 
enforcement and courts’ and Congress’s unwillingness to challenge 
this expansive enforcement agenda over the past decade is a 
mistake. Immigration lawyers, scholars, and policymakers concede 
too much when they give up on the notion of integrative 
enforcement as an alternative normative foundation for policy. 
That enforcement remains the preoccupation of federal 
immigration policy is unlikely to change given the continuing 
inability of Congress to enact comprehensive immigration reform 
and the lack of political will to overcome President Trump’s 
immigration policies. Our immigration laws need to recognize 
                                                                                                     
 93. The essays comparing U.S. and European approaches toward managing 
security note that the United States focuses on the “enemy abroad” while Europe 
focuses on the “enemy within.” SIMON REICH, IMMIGRATION, INTEGRATION, AND 
SECURITY: AMERICA AND EUROPE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 9 (2008). 
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immigrants consist of more than their status and that there are 
different kinds of enforcement goals for differently-situated 
immigrants. DACA recipients are not social or cultural threats, 
high tech and guest workers are not stealing jobs, and refugees are 
not always trying to drain the welfare state. Unlawful presence or 
lapses in immigration status do not by themselves make one unfit 
for citizenship. Immigrants from countries in disfavor are not all 
criminals and national security threats. Enforcement-first policy 
goals do not have to mean enforcement-only policies. Other norms 
and values—arising from social norms, local practices, and 
international law—can and do apply in ways that blunt 
enforcement excess and extend the capacity for integration.  
Disengagement of those who disagree with the federal 
immigration policy does not help. The Article highlights examples 
of cities, states, corporations, churches, and campuses infusing 
enforcement with a more integrative flavor, which models a way to 
advance a conversation based on a different conceptual foundation 
for citizenship. In this way, they can fill critical gaps. They can also 
transform the national conversation. In the long run their efforts 
to affix the regulation of citizenship status to membership, rather 
than formal status, clarifies the purpose of regulating membership 
in a nation-state. The clarified vision develops new policy tools and 
charts new policy pathways that go beyond the current 
institutional design that disfavors noncitizens.  
In closing, enforcement measures can exist alongside 
integrative goals in immigration. While this Article adopts the 
belief that incorporating immigrants serves the nation, it is not a 
plea for undermining the federal government’s ability to protect its 
borders, allocate its resources, or define its membership. The fate 
of integration and enforcement are bound up in one another. They 
are intertwined in networks of shared governance, as opposed to 
distinct functions that can be rigidly divided among different 
institutional sectors or levels of government.  
